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Insensate Oysters and 
Our Nonconsensual Existence
Karl Steel
 But the life of a man is of no greater importance to 
the universe than that of an oyster
—David Hume, “On Suicide”
What is prematurely, or belatedly, called the ‘I’ is,  
at the outset, enthralled.
—Judith Butler, Precarious Life1
The earliest version of this paper, delivered at the Oceanic New York symposium, tried to change the way people normally write about oysters. Oyster 
books love to talk about pearls and Chesapeake Bay’s oyster 
war; they love how oyster middens chart the passage not 
of cavemen but of “covemen,” who followed the beds of 
oysters around coasts in a kind of gustatory cartography.2 
These same writers happily accept the oyster’s fleshy invita-
tion to aphrodisiacal excess. And when they look to New 
1 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the Posthumous 
Essays, Of the Immortality of the Soul, and Of Suicide, from An 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding of Miracles, ed. Richard H. 
Popkin. 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1998), 100; Judith Butler, 
Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 
2004), 45.
2 For a superior discussion of human development and the waters, 
see John R. Gillis, The Human Shore: Seacoasts in History (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2012).
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York City, they love to mourn the loss of its oyster beds, 
closed by pollution and over-harvesting, perhaps for good, 
in 1927, once home to trillions of the creatures, a seed-
bed for nostalgia for the grittier appetites of New York’s 
presumably populist past.3 I asked us to remember the 
oyster itself by remembering its shell, calcium carbonate, 
particularly important now to offset the increasing acidi-
fication of the oceans; likewise, I asked that we appreciate 
how prodigiously a living oyster filters water. What they 
ingest and don’t eat, oysters eject as pseudofeces, which, 
coated in mucous, fall to the ocean floor to be processed by 
anoxic bacteria. The cleaner, deacidified water oysters leave 
behind is what just about everything else needs to live. I 
wanted us to look to projects to use bring oysters back to 
New York, like the architect Kate Orff ’s call for “oystertec-
ture,” an “invertebrate architecture” to help abate the force 
of hurricanes, to keep New York City safe from our future’s 
inevitable Sandies.4
3 For a sampling of oyster books, see Mark Kurlansky, The Big Oyster: 
History on the Half Shell (New York: Ballantine Books, 2006); Rebecca 
Stott, Oyster (London: Reaktion, 2004); Drew Smith, Oyster: A World 
History (Stroud: History Press, 2010); Robb Walsh, Sex, Death & 
Oysters: A Half-Shell Lover’s World Tour (Berkeley: Counterpoint, 
2009); John R. Wennersten, The Oyster Wars of Chesapeake Bay 
(Centreville, MD: Tidewater Publishers, 1981). The libretto of an  
1880 comic opera on the Chesapeake Bay Oyster Wars (“Driven  
from the Seas: or, The Pirate Dredger’s Doom”) is available online  
at https://digitalarchive.wm.edu/handle/10288/17235
4 For oyster facts, see the following New York Times articles: Andrew 
C. Revkin, “Students Press the Case for Oysters as New York’s Surge 
Protector,” Nov 12, 2012, sec. Opinion; Alan Feuer, “Protecting the 
City, Before Next Time,” Nov 3, 2013, sec. NY/Region; and Douglas 
Quenqua, “Oyster Shells Are an Antacid to the Oceans,” May 20, 
2013, sec. Science. See also Kate Orff ’s “Oyster-Tecture” exhibit at 
MoMA’s ‘Rising Currents’ 2010 Exhibition, http://www.scapestudio.
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And that’s all of course still important, but that 
approach still thinks of the oyster primarily there to be 
used, not as food this time, but as the ocean’s purifier 
and our salvation. The oyster in itself still remains on the 
outside of our care, distinct from us, exiled to where even 
Peter Singer left them, with the plants and the rocks, when 
he notoriously declared that the line between ethically sig-
nificant and ethically insignificant animals lies “somewhere 
between a shrimp and an oyster.” When Singer himself says 
that there’s “no good reason for avoiding eating sustainably 
produced oysters,” because oysters are no more likely 
to feel pain than plants do, it seems that no one could 
possibly remain to care about the oyster as such.5 This 
helplessness, this absolute passivity of the oyster’s flesh, will 
be the object subject of this essay. I see the oyster’s passivity 
and exposure to being injured as not as alien to our human 
condition, but—maybe predictably—as emblematic of 
it, countering both the certainty that the chief feature of 
humans is our agency and that oysters, being just objects, 
are completely outside the possibilities of justice.
This carelessness about oysters is a rare instance where 
the thoughts of Peter Singer and his arch-nemesis overlap. 
Descartes’ November 1646 letter to Margaret Cavendish, 
Duchess of Newcastle, argues that if one believed that 
animals had thought, like us, and therefore an immortal 
soul, then one would have to believe this of all animals, 
com/projects/oyster-tecture/. I thank Alison Kinney for the phrase 
“invertebrate architecture.”
5 For Singer’s oyster opinions, see Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A 
New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: New York Review, 
1975), 188; and Christopher Cox, “Consider the Oyster,” Slate Magazine, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/food/2010/04/consider_the_oyster.
html (accessed May 22, 2014).
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oysters or sponges included, which are “too imperfect for 
this to credible [nimis imperfecta sunt, quam ut hoc de iis 
judicari queat].”6 In other words, says Descartes, because 
oysters are so evidently irrational, animals of whatever type 
are basically mechanical in their actions, like clocks. The 
monstrous implications and results of this conclusion are 
all too easy to trace. While Descartes’ lesson would obvi-
ously outrage Singer, both still finally write off the oyster. 
For both, the oyster, so helpless and so silent, is the point 
where we get to stop caring.
Our effort to save animals from Cartesianism and 
even Singerism might begin by giving oysters a voice. Two 
examples of this rare literary trick follow, one from the 
tenth century, the other from the fifteenth; readers are 
invited to continue this work into their own favored oyster 
literature, perhaps starting with the silent, misunderstood, 
and helpless victims in Lewis Carroll’s “The Walrus and  
the Carpenter.” The first of my examples, an Anglo-Saxon 
riddle, imagines an oyster, “unable to move” (literally, 
“feþelease,” footless), whose first-person complaint help-
lessly anticipates the bestial voraciousness of some man 
who will tear it open “to devour [freten] my flesh” raw. 
Then, in the 1540s, we find another talking oyster, in 
Giovanni Gelli’s adaptation and expansion of Plutarch’s 
Gryllus.7 Plutarch features Ulysses’s philosophical argument 
6 “To the Marquess of Newcastle,” The Philosophical Writings of 
Descartes, Vol. III: The Correspondence, trans. Robert Stoothoff (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 304; for the Latin original in 
a version easily accessed online, see Renati Descartes, Epistolae, Pars 
Prima (Amsterdam: Blaviana, 1682), 109.
7 For the riddle, I use the edition and translation, with some 
modifications, from Mercedes Salvador, “The Oyster and the Crab:  
A Riddle Duo (nos. 77 and 78) in the Exeter Book,” Modern Philology 
101.3 (2004): 400–419; for Gelli, I use Giovanni Battista Gelli, Circe: 
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with one of his men, since transformed by the sorceress 
Circe into a pig (Gryllus means “Grunter”), in which they 
debate the respective advantages of humanity and porcinity. 
The pig wins. Gelli outdoes Plutarch by letting Ulysses be 
out-argued by a series of increasingly complex animals 
until he, at last, convinces a philosophical elephant, and 
only the elephant, to let itself become human again. The 
first, and lowest, animal is, of course, an oyster, a former 
fishmonger, which argues that nature evidently loves 
oysters best, since, by outfitting them with their own home 
and clothes, she frees them from having to work.
 Both the riddle and the philosophical dialogue grant 
oysters a voice through what Jane Bennett called the “touch 
of anthropomorphism.”8 However, while Bennett concen-
trates on the usually unconsidered agency of garbage heaps, 
earthworms, or power grids, these two oyster works speak 
not of agency but rather of what the oysters cannot avoid. 
As in “The Walrus and the Carpenter,” the voice of the 
oyster is mainly a voice of vulnerability. These unmuted 
oysters say that they, like us, want to live. They want not 
to be injured. The oyster of the Anglo-Saxon talks about 
nothing but its utter helplessness, while Gelli’s oyster agrees 
to speak only if “those confounded crabs shall not throw a 
stone between my two shells.. .[to] make a meal of me.”9
Consisting of Ten Dialogues between Ulysses and Several Men 
Transformed into Beasts, Satirically Representing the Various Passions 
of Mankind and the Many Infelicities of Human Life, trans. Thomas 
Brown, ed. Robert Martin Adams (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1963).
8 Jane Bennett. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2010), 99.
9 Gelli, Circe 12.
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We ought to seek out fictional experiments like these. 
It’s good for our imagination and maybe good for our 
ethics and maybe even good for oysters. When we read 
or teach texts like these, we advance the new materialist 
discovery of agency in places where most people would 
never expect to find it. It may be exciting, even chilling, to 
suspend our disbelief to work out how even the most inert 
of animals might themselves resist, fight back, or make 
something new. Or call out to us. But the danger of doing 
this through texts like the riddle and the Gelli is that of 
thinking the main way to make an oyster, for example, 
ethically relevant is to throw our voices into it. Another 
danger may be exactly that “touch of anthropomorphism” 
in the new materialisms, which is normally a discovery 
that nonhuman things can, like us, act agentially. This 
presumes too much about what it means to be subjected 
to this human condition. As I will argue below, most of 
our existence is nonconsensual. Therefore, I am proposing 
that a more thorough posthumanism might work harder 
to move in the other direction, by concentrating not on 
agency but on helplessness. I plead guilty to the charge that 
new materialism posthumanism mystifies the relationship 
of humans and objects; but it’s not that I want to make the 
table dance, but that I want to concentrate on the obtuse-
ness of objects, humans and otherwise, because “agency” is 
only one, small way in which we all get to engage with our 
environment.
I will do this by taking advantage of oysters’ most 
salient characteristic, which is not their voice, not their 
anxiety, nor their sensitivity, but rather the absence of 
any of this. As even Peter Singer reminds us, oysters are 
some of the most insensitive and helpless of animals. For 
the speaking oysters of the riddle and the dialogue, what 
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is most notable is not their (temporary) rationality but 
rather their particular helplessness, their ineluctable 
condition of injurability, which, more than any animal, 
exemplifies what Derrida called the “nonpower at the heart 
of power.”10 What may be needed, then, is not a “touch of 
anthropomorphism” to bring oysters over to us but rather a 
“touch of oystermorphism” to recognize how much of our 
existence we share with theirs. If we think with oysters, or 
even as oysters, we might recognize how much of our life is 
helpless, and how small a part rationality and agency play 
even in our lives. This essay will finally argue that we are 
more like oysters than not.
We will therefore leave behind the speaking oysters 
of the Exeter Riddles and Gelli to get more deeply into the 
ancient oyster tradition in which Descartes was writing. 
At least since Pliny, oysters were thought primarily as the 
animal without motion, without family, and with virtually 
no capacity to react. In the later fourteenth century, John 
Trevisa explains that:
The parts of the great world are so ordered and set 
that the highest point of the lower creature touches 
the lowest point of the next creature, as oysters and 
shellfish, which are the lowest in animal kind, sur-
passing but little the highest form of life of trees and 
plants, for oysters cannot move except in the way that 
kelp of the sea wags with the water, as otherwise they 
10 Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, trans. David 
Wills, ed. Marie-Louise Mallet (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2008), 28.
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cling to the earth and cannot see nor hear nor taste 
nor smell; but they feel only when they are touched.11
Philippe de Thaon’s Bestiare (after 1121) believes that oysters 
are a kind of stone, which open to receive Heaven’s dew “as 
if they were living creatures,” which, having received the 
dew, “become again without shapes” [puis se revugnent 
senz faitures].”12
Like rocks or plants, they were insensitive to pain, 
with only the barest glimmer of life. This semi-lifelessness 
meant they were fair game for Christians, even during 
fast days. Fish were allowed, primarily because their flesh, 
being so unlike ours, was unlikely to stir up our strength 
and our pleasure, and because fish were creatures that are, 
per Aquinas, “merely bodies having in them something 
of a soul” as compared to “land animals,” which are 
“living souls with bodies subject to them.”13 At least for 
those medievals who knew their natural history, oysters 
were anything but an aphrodisiac; being only barely 
alive, oysters were perfectly suited—according to one 
11 John Trevisa, trans. Polychronicon, ed. Churchill Babington, Vol. II 
(London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1869), 181, “Also as it is in þe 
parties of þe grete world þat þey beeþ so i-ordeyned and i-sette þat þe 
ouermese of þe neþer kynde touche þe neþermeste of þe ouer kynde, 
as oistres and schelle fishe, þat beeþ as it were lowest in bestene kynde, 
passeþ but litel þe perfeccioun of lyf of treen and of herbes, for þey 
mowe not meue hem but as culpes of þe see waggeþ wiþ þe water, 
elles þey cleueþ to þe erthe and mowe noþer see ne hire, ne naste, ne 
smelle, but onliche fele when þey beeþ i-touched.”
12 In Thomas Wright, ed. and trans. Popular Treatises on Science Written 
During the Middle Ages (London: Y. R. and J. E. Taylor, 1841), 127.
13 For the Aquinas, see his Summa Theologica I.72, “On the Work of the 
Sixth Day,” and II.II.147, Art. 8, “The meats from which it is necessary 
to abstain.”
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fifteenth-century civic record—to signify the “sadnesse and 
abstinence of merth [that] shulde followe...an holy tyme.”14
In all these writers, oysters function mainly to occupy 
or delineate the space between inside and outside, in this 
case, between life and nonlife, animal and plant, and pain 
and a kind of mostly invulnerable life. Or they function to 
imagine the helpless materiality of fleshly life, animal life 
at its most stonelike. They do this in two ways: the first, as 
materializing life in its foundational quality, where on the 
scale of existence stones come to life, so here, then, is the 
bare basis for material animal life; and second, oysters 
materialize life in its insensible, material exposure to harm, 
to need, and to simply needing to be here or anywhere at all.
The oyster’s animal existence could not register 
more faintly on our attention, just as our own basic 
fleshy existence does not tend to register on ours, until, 
of course, something goes wrong. For all that, the oyster 
exists, plant- and rocklike as it is. And as such, the oyster 
is vulnerable. This inescapable condition is what ties us to 
oysters most strongly, for whatever the considerable uses of 
reason and speech, neither can eliminate our fundamental 
vulnerability.
We’re now in a position to reconsider Descartes’  
letter to Cavendish. This short letter only slowly gets to 
its conclusive denial of thought and soul to nonhuman 
animals, and this it does only by retreating to faith:  
Descartes just insists that it would be absurd to believe 
that oysters, and so on, would have immortal souls. This 
14 The quotation is from one account of the Lenten costume John 
Gladman supposedly wore for his January 25, 1443, revolt in Norwich; 
cited from Chris Humphrey, The Politics of Carnival: Festive Misrule 
in Medieval England (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 
2001), 66.
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is itself a kind of mechanical reflex, a rare instance where 
Descartes’ free thought snaps neatly into place because of 
instinct. The irony starts earlier though, as much of the 
letter is instead about the automatism of most human life. 
It explains that somnambulant humans sometimes swim 
across rivers they could never cross while awake; for the 
most part, we need not think in order to be able to eat or 
walk; and if tried not to cover our face as we fell, we would 
fail. Our fellow humans may themselves be driven only 
mechanically, even in their most apparently thoughtful 
moments. All Descartes can say confidently is that, unlike 
animals, we ourselves can communicate things not relating 
to our passions, but, at least in this letter, he provides no 
sustained proof that the communication even of other 
humans is anything but mechanical repetition. That is, 
only irrational custom or an equally irrational sympathetic 
guesswork protects Descartes’ human fellows from being 
eaten, used, and vivisected. This guesswork overlays a more 
fundamental animal condition that is, for the most part, 
unconscious. Like other animals, we have our passions; like 
other animals, our passions have us, and our expressions—
of hunger, of self-protection, of motion—are the voice not 
of our freedom but of our vulnerable bodily existence. To 
use Descartes’ image, we may not be clocks, not entirely, 
but we are mostly clocks.
For even Descartes begins by admitting that the 
dominant condition of being human is unwilled exposure. 
Our existence is at its root not chosen, not rational, not 
elective, but rather, primarily, nonconsensual. We flatter 
ourselves by thinking that our freedom of choice is our 
defining characteristic, but we might ask, with Derrida, 
“whether what calls itself human has the right rigorously 
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to attribute to man...what he refuses the animal.”15 We do 
not chose to be born. We do not chose the conditions of 
our being here any more than an oyster does. Our much 
vaunted ability to willingly move, which we hold out over 
the oysters, still doesn’t untether us from having to live 
somewhere. The same goes for our ability to seek out our 
food rather than just receive it as the water gives it, like an 
oyster, because we still must eat. Whatever the powers of 
our agency to supplement our fundamental inadequacy by 
building ourselves homes, by wrapping ourselves in clothes 
and armor, we can never eliminate our vulnerability. We 
cover ourselves for the same reasons, and with the same 
necessity, that oysters do.
We can now reconsider and even reverse the stan-
dard hierarchy of being that holds humans superior to 
plants and plants superior to rocks. The tradition is neatly 
expressed by the fifteenth-century Middle English Mirror 
of St Edmund:
You may see God’s wisdom if you attend to what kind 
of being God to each creature. Some he has given to 
be only, without anything more, like stones. To others, 
to be and to velive, like grass and trees. To others, to 
be, to live, and to feel, like beasts. To others, to be, 
to live, to feel, and to judge rationally, like men and 
angels.16
15 Derrida, Animal that Therefore, 135.
16 In Religious Pieces in Prose and Verse, ed. G. G. Perry. 1867. EETS 
o.s. 26. 2nd ed. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1913), 22, “His 
wysdom may þou see if þou take kepe how he [God] hase gyffen to 
ylke a creature to be. Some he hase gyffen to be anely, with-owtten 
mare, als vn-to stanes. Till oþer to be & to lyffe, als to grysse and trees. 
Till oþer to be, to lyffe, to fele, als to bestes. Till oþer to be, to lyffe, to 
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Usually, in Descartes for example, the last, rational kind of 
being is thought to be the most important. With reason, 
or so the story goes, we can do nearly anything. Through 
it, we can separate ourselves from our immediate circum-
stances and from every other living thing and then finally, 
at least in mainstream medieval Christianity, we might live 
forever through our immortal rational soul rejoined with 
a perfected body, so escaping vulnerability altogether. But 
among created things, only angels escape being tethered to 
the previous kinds of being. For everything else, every kind 
of being is additive, supplementing rather than replacing 
the previous ones. We could therefore read this hierarchy 
of being as one in which the final rational addition is a 
veneer over an existence that is mostly animal-like, plant-
like, or stonelike. Like angels, humans can reason, but they 
also have the same capacities—and accompanying vulnera-
bilities and needs—as beasts, plants, and rocks.
In this time of climate change, a time, perhaps 
more than any other, in which the greatest forces are not 
bounded individuals but rather hyperobjects, far beyond 
our understanding, we should remember ourselves as 
being as helplessly and perhaps as ignorantly enthralled 
to the dangers as any oyster.17 As Judith Butler observes 
in Precarious Life and Frames of War, most of us are 
fele, and with resone to deme, als to mane and to angells. For stanes 
erre, bot þay ne hafe nogte lyffe, ne felys noghte, ne demes noghte. 
Trees are; þay lyffe, bot thay fele noghte. Men are; þay lyffe, þay fele, 
and þay deme, and þay erre with stanes, [þay] lyffe with trees, þay fele 
with bestes, and demys with angels.”
17 See Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after 
the End of the World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2013); see also Steve Mentz’s post-equilibrium ecology, expressed, for 
example, in “Strange weather in King Lear.” Shakespeare 6.2 (2010): 
139–152.
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compelled to be more exposed than others, most of us 
unheard, and most made more helpless than others; some 
of us like to pretend we are exempt, but ultimately, we 
are all vulnerable. All of us are more or less wittingly in a 
risk society, and even if we assemble the kinds of amateur 
scientific knowledge Stacy Alaimo traces in her Bodily 
Natures to learn just what in this environment is poisoning 
us, we still might find ourselves only more aware of our 
helpless enthrallment, without having solved the problem 
of just having to be here.18 All we might come to know is 
what the oyster of the Anglo-Saxon Riddle already knows, 
that something, completely insensitive to us, is coming to 
devour us and to move on, without knowing.
18 Stacy Alaimo, Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material 
Self (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010).

